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JUSTICE FOR ALL?  
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST  
IN INVESTMENT TREATIES 
ALESSANDRA ARCURI* 
FRANCESCO MONTANARO** 
Abstract: Investment arbitration has come increasingly under fire because of 
its design flaws. There is an emerging consensus that investment treaty 
arbitration not only falls short of ensuring a sufficient degree of transparency 
of arbitral proceedings and impartiality of arbitrators, but also that its 
institutional architecture is unjustifiably asymmetric, entrusting foreign 
investors with significant rights while no protection is afforded to the host 
states’ constituencies. In response to these criticisms, several states have 
attempted in recent years to reform the rules governing investor-state 
arbitration. A perusal of recently concluded international investment 
agreements, however, reveals that the reform efforts so far have focused on 
the first two shortcomings. Very little, instead, has been done with regard to 
the asymmetric character of the system. This Essay seeks to specifically 
address this flaw, by placing the rights of investment-affected people on par 
with those of investors. To do this, we seek to display the viable alternatives to 
the currently predominant—and flawed—model of investment dispute 
settlement. We start by outlining the features of the investor-state dispute 
settlement system that lie at the root of the system’s legitimacy crisis. In 
particular, relying on a burgeoning body of scholarship, we expose the 
inadequacy of private order dispute settlement mechanisms in dealing with 
mainly public law disputes. Bearing this in mind, we contend that future 
reform efforts should reckon with the rights and interests of the individuals 
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and groups of individuals who are likely to be affected by the investment op-
operations. In other words, States can only remove the asymmetric character 
of the system by endowing this category of individuals with substantive and 
procedural rights. We also argue that international investment agreements 
should go beyond their traditional protective function by aiming to keep 
investors’ conduct in check. We opine that such agreements should also 
clearly establish investors’ obligations to safeguard the wide range of non-
investment interests implicated in investment operations. This Essay 
envisages three innovative models for the solution of investment disputes and 
presents a comparative analysis of alternative scenarios. The first suggests the 
abandonment of investment arbitration in favor of soft-law grievance 
mechanisms. The second envisages arbitration for both investors and 
investment-affected parties. The third proposal is a networked system where 
arbitration is coupled with grievance mechanisms for investment-affected 
individuals. In short, we submit that future treaties should either completely 
ditch the ISDS system or undertake a major overhaul of the system. Each 
proposal has its limits and promises. We conclude that, in spite of their limits, 
any of these proposals would offer a superior alternative to the dramatic 
deficiencies of the current system and future research should be directed to 
further articulate the contours of our proposals. 
INTRODUCTION 
Few areas of international law are more controversial than international 
investment law. Debate traditionally rages over international rules—both 
customary and conventional—on foreign investment. Opponents of such 
rules often level criticisms against investment treaty arbitration for its lack of 
impartiality, transparency, and coherence.1 More crucially, the international 
investment regime is often regarded as an unbalanced system that favors 
corporate interests.2 
Not surprisingly, international investment reform proposals have 
proliferated among scholars and practitioners. Recent treaty practice has 
also been the subject of reform efforts.3 The most significant of these efforts 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 32–33 (2015); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
AND PUBLIC LAW 152–67 (2008); Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment 
Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 785–89 (2008). 
 2 See Frank J. Garcia et al., Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from 
International Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 869–70 (2015). 
 3 See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTE (ICSID), CONVENTION ARBITRATION 
RULES ON TRANSPARENCY (2017); UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE LAW 
(UNCITRAL), RULES ON TRANSPARENCY (Apr. 1, 2014); North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, ¶ A(1), FOREIGN TRADE INFO. SYS. (July 
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concern the dispute settlement mechanism provided by international in-
investment treaties. Recent international investment agreements (“IIAs”) 
and arbitration rules put greater emphasis on the transparency of arbitral 
proceedings, arbitrators’ independence, and arbitral decisions’ consistency.4 
Additionally, new IIAs feature less vague investment protection standards 
and seek to reconcile investment protection with a wide range of non-
investment interests, such as environmental protection, human rights, and 
labor rights.5 
Notwithstanding these developments, such treaties still fail to fully 
address their central flaw: their asymmetric structure, which allows 
investors to hold both substantive and procedural rights, but the 
communities affected by such investments to have neither.6 In this Essay, 
we set out to identify models for reforms that can address this major pitfall. 
Given the limited scope of this Essay, these three models are only sketched 
and serve the purpose of identifying new directions for reforms. Future 
research is necessary to further study the fine points and legal design of 
each alternative.  
Part I of this Essay discusses the features of the investor-state dispute 
settlement (“ISDS”) system that lie at the root of the system’s legitimacy 
crisis.7 Part II explains possible substantive reforms, which require formal 
obligations for investors and rights to the civil society likely to be affected 
by the investment operations.8 Part III examines the emergence of Public 
Alternative Complaint Mechanisms (“PACoMs”), such as Ombudsbodies 
and National Contact Points as existing practices aimed at ensuring the 
accountability of international institutions and of the corporation operating 
                                                                                                                           
31, 2001), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp [https://perma.
cc/MYB3-9SP4] [hereinafter NAFTA Notes of Interpretation].  
 4 See, e.g., NAFTA Notes of Interpretation, supra note 3, ¶ A(1). 
 5 See, e.g., Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Morocco-Nigeria, art. 
24 (Dec. 3, 2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5409 [https://
perma.cc/3V3S-U7RN] [hereinafter Morocco-Nigeria BIT] (requiring investors and host states to 
assess the potential impact of an investment on the local community). See generally Eric De 
Brabandere, Host States’ Due Diligence Obligations in International Investment Law, 42 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 319, 320 (2015) (discussing specific obligations that IIAs sometimes impose on 
host states); Tarcisio Gazzini, The 2016 Morocco-Nigeria BIT: An Important Contribution to the 
Reform of Investment Treaties, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.iisd.org/itn/
2017/09/26/the-2016-morocco-nigeria-bit-an-important-contribution-to-the-reform-of-investment-
treaties-tarcisio-gazzini/ [https://perma.cc/NTB7-A3ZV] (discussing the likely impact of the 
Morocco-Nigeria BIT reforms in detail). 
 6 See Mattias Kumm, An Empire of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the 
Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, 4 ESIL REFLECTION 1, 5 (2015). 
 7 See infra notes 11–76 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 78–110 and accompanying text. 
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transnationally, as well as the protection of rights of affected parties.9 Final-
Finally, Part IV provides possible methods to ensure investment-affected 
people’s access to remedies in the investment regime, which include three 
alternatives: PACoMs as an alternative of investment treaty arbitration; 
access to investment treaty arbitration for all; and a networked system that 
combines existing arbitration tools with other grievance mechanisms.10 
Overall, this Essay submits that the future treaties should either completely 
eliminate the ISDS system or undertake a major overhaul of the system. 
Despite the limits of each alternative, this Essay concludes that any of these 
proposals would offer a superior alternative to the dramatic deficiencies of 
the current system. 
I. THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
The ISDS system is one of the distinctive features of the investment 
treaty-based protection regime.11 IIAs generally contain investment dispute 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra notes 111–145 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 146–167 and accompanying text. 
 11 See generally DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, OECD, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q6D3-3S79]. Only few investment agreements do not grant access to such a dispute settlement 
mechanism. These include either agreements concluded in the early days of the “Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (“BIT”) revolution” or very recent treaties, particularly Australia and Brazil’s investment 
agreements. Id. at 8 n.2; see, e.g., Acuerdo de Cooperación y Facilitación de Inversiones [Investment 
Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement], Braz.-Chile, Nov. 24, 2015, http://investmentpolicy
hub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4712 [https://perma.cc/8SJZ-7MBZ] (containing no ISDS 
mechanism); Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos [Agreement for Cooperation 
and Facilitation of Investments], Angl.-Braz., Apr. 1, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/Download/TreatyFile/4720 [https://perma.cc/V48D-8WPU] (same); Acordo de Cooperação e 
Facilitação de Investimentos [Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments], Braz.-
Mozam., Mar. 30, 2015, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4717 [https://
perma.cc/D8P7-V6KG] [hereinafter Brazil-Mozambique ACFI] (same); Malaysia-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, Austl.-Malay. (May 22, 2012), http://fta.miti.gov.my/miti-fta/resources/Malaysia-
Australia/MAFTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/23EL-4SGN] (same); Agreement Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Indon., Nov. 8 1968, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3334 [https://perma.cc/4NCS-M6CS] 
(same); Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(with Protocol), Den.-Indon., Jan. 30, 1968, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/2977 [https://perma.cc/PUQ9-FA8S] (same); Treaty Concerning the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Promotion of Investments, Ger.-Iran, Nov. 11, 1965, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3502 [https://perma.cc/3GJ2-96ER] (same); Accord de 
Commerce, de Protection des Investissemenets et de Coopération Technique [Trade, Investment 
Protection and Technical Cooperation Agreement], Congo-Switz., Oct. 18, 1962, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/817 [https://perma.cc/8LY4-XZEF] (same). 
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clauses, whereby the contracting states give their prospective consent12 to 
submit to arbitration any future disputes stemming from an alleged violation 
of substantive provisions of the IIAs.13 As the number of IIAs containing 
ISDS clauses increased over time, investment arbitration gained an 
unprecedented importance in the resolution of investment disputes.14 
Nevertheless, investment arbitration soon became a victim of its own 
success.15 The increasing number of investment disputes exposed the main 
shortcomings of the most popular arbitration rules.16 
This Part illustrates the main criticisms raised against the investment 
arbitration system. Section A discusses the current regime’s procedural 
deficiencies, including the adjudicating body’s lack of independence and 
impartiality, the system’s overall incoherence, and its lack of transparency.17 
Section B describes the asymmetry in-build in the investment treaty 
arbitration system, whereby investors are entrusted with significant rights 
and investment-affected individuals and communities with almost none.18 
Section C examines current reform efforts and developments emerged in 
recent investment treaty practice.19 Finally, Section D exposes the 
inadequacy of private order dispute settlement mechanisms in dealing with 
mainly public law disputes.20 
A. Procedural Deficiencies 
1. Lack of Independence and Impartiality of the Adjudicatory Body 
Investment arbitration is often considered as being too prone to the 
interests of foreign investors. This is primarily because under the most 
                                                                                                                           
 12 ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 6 (2014). 
 13 This way of establishing arbitral tribunals’ jurisdiction has been famously dubbed 
“arbitration without privity.” See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 
232, 234 (1995). 
 14 See Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV. 372, 396 (2014). 
 15 See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1539 (2005). 
 16 See UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Information Note on the United States 
and the European Union, IIA ISSUES NOTE, June 2014, at 9–10, https://unctad.org/en/Publications
Library/webdiaepcb2014d4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS4H-RZBV]. See generally Giorgio Sacerdoti, 
Investment Arbitration Under ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules: Prerequisites, Applicable Law, Review 
of Awards, 19 ICSID REV. 1 (2004) (providing a comparative analysis of selected aspects of these 
bodies of rules). 
 17 See infra notes 21–39 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text. 
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commonly used arbitration rules, namely the United Nations Commission 
on Internal Trade Law (UNCTRIAL) and the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules, parties to a dispute play 
an important—although not exclusive—role in selecting arbitrators. This 
has been cuttingly defined as “the ultimate form of forum shopping”21 
because party-appointed arbitrators are inherently more likely to uphold the 
claims put forward by the party who selected them. More generally, this 
system could induce arbitrators to uphold the views of those who have the 
power to trigger the ISDS system—i.e., the investors—in order to obtain 
future appointments.22 Besides, some commentators have noted that 
arbitrators belong to a racially and culturally homogenous circle. In fact, in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, parties appoint arbitrators from North 
America and Western Europe.23 A recent survey showed that a small circle of 
fifteen Western arbitrators decided fifty-five percent of all investment 
arbitrations.24 Arbitrators can thus be viewed as an epistemic community 
whose members share a similar pro-market attitude and trust in international 
arbitration,25 which affects the interpretation of the vague standards set out in 
IIAs.26 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See Catherine A. Rogers, The International Arbitrator Information Project: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2012/08/09/the-international-arbitrator-information-project-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/ 
[https://perma.cc/HD2V-H752]. 
 22 See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 455 (2013); Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical 
Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211, 
221 (2012). 
 23 See ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS (ISSUE 2016-2), at 18 (2016), https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202016-2%20(English)%20
Sept%2020%20-%20corrected.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEM9-E5MA]. 
 24 PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY & THE TRANSNAT’L 
INST., Profiting from Injustice—How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers Are Fueling an In-
vestment Arbitration Boom (2012), https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/profiting-injustice [https://
perma.cc/S22A-VBG3]; see also Emmanuel Gaillard, Sociology of International Arbitration, in 
PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 188, 201 (David Caron et al. eds., 
2015) (examining lack of impartiality in the ISDS system). 
 25 YVES DEZELAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 16 (1996); B. Audit 
et al., Table Ronde: Le Système Actuel est-il Déséquilibré en Faveur de L’investisseur Privé Étranger 
et au Détriment de L’état D’accueil?, in LE CONTENTIEUX ARBITRAL TRANSNATIONAL RELATIF À 
L’INVESTISSEMENT: NOUVEAUX DÉVELOPPEMENTS 185, 187–90 (Charles Leben & Joe Verhoeven 
eds., 2006). 
 26 M. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 27. 
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2. Incoherence 
The tendency of investor arbitration to deliver inconsistent decisions 
often results in unsustainable legal uncertainty.27 Arbitral tribunals often in-
terpret similar or even the same provisions of IIAs but somehow decide 
cases with almost identical fact patterns in different manners.28 The uncer-
tainty shrouding the meaning of the main investment standards might in-
duce host states not to exercise their regulatory power in order to preempt 
possible investment claims, creating a so-called “regulatory chill”.29 
This tendency to inconsistency is brought about by the very features of 
investment arbitration.30 First, arbitral decisions do not have the value of 
creating binding precedent, but only produce persuasive effects on subse-
quent tribunals.31 Second, investment tribunals apply a myriad of invest-
ment agreements.32 Third, the insufficient application of consolidation tech-
niques, the oft-artificial separation between treaty and investment claims, 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Christoph Schreuer, Coherence and Consistency in International Investment Law, in PRO-
SPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 391, 398 (Robert Echandi & Pierre 
Sauvé eds., 2013) [hereinafter PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW]; Louis T. 
Wells, Backlash to Investment Arbitration: Three Causes, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVEST-
MENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 341, 342 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY]. 
 28 See Anders Nilsson & Oscar Englesson, Inconsistent Awards in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion: Is an Appeals Court Needed?, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 561, 563–69 (2013); Frank Spoorenberg & 
Jorge Viñuales, Conflicting Decisions in International Arbitration, 8 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & 
TRIBUNALS 91, 94 (2009). 
 29 Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International In-
vestment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1040 (2010). 
 30 See Yas Banitafemi, Consistency in the Interpretation of Substantive Investment Rules: Is It 
Achievable?, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 27, at 200, 203–
204 (“Thus, each arbitral tribunal engages in a one-off interpretation with no precedential value 
other than for the parties.”). 
 31 See El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 39 (Apr. 27, 2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/Online
Awards/C17/DC511_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GFC-345W] (stating that “ICSID arbitral tribunals 
are established ad hoc, from case to case . . . and the present Tribunal knows of no provision, ei-
ther in that Convention or in the BIT, establishing an obligation of stare decisis . . .”); Catherine 
Kessedjian, To Give or Not to Give Precedential Value to Investment Arbitration Awards, in THE 
FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 43, 67 (Catherine Rogers & Roger Alford eds., 2009); see 
also Giorgio Sacerdoti, Precedent in the Settlement of International Economic Disputes: The WTO 
and Investment Arbitration Models, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 225 (Arthur Rovine ed., 2010) (discussing the benefits 
and consequences of the lack of consistency in decision making by arbitral tribunals); Gilbert 
Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SET-
TLEMENT 5, 5 (2011) (discussing how, despite the lack of a stare decisis rule in international law, 
permanent jurisdictions continue to reference their own past decisions). 
 32 See STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 15–16 (2009); Spoorenberg & Viñuales, supra note 28, at 96. 
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and the narrow interpretation of the res judicata principle further exacerbate 
the vexed problem of parallel proceedings.33 Fourth, there is no general ob-
ligation to publish arbitral proceedings.34 Finally investor-state arbitration 
does not provide for any type of appellate mechanism;35 the only, very lim-
ited exception to this is the ad hoc annulment procedure under Article 52 of 
the ICSID Convention.36 
3. Lack of Transparency 
Investment arbitration has also been lambasted for its lack of transpar-
ency. Originally emerging as a brainchild of international commercial arbi-
tration, investment arbitration traditionally places more emphasis on confi-
dentiality than on transparency.37 Although confidentiality does not raise 
particular issues for purely private disputes, it may be problematic in the 
context of investment arbitration, in which disputes often have a more “pub-
lic dimension.”38 The procedural rules governing investment arbitration 
have thus long been considered deficient in terms of access to relevant in-
formation and participation of third-parties.39 
B. Institutional Imbalance: The Great Asymmetry 
The other most serious deficiency of the ISDS system is its imbalance. 
On the one hand, the system protects foreign investors, on the other hand, 
citizens, domestic investors, and host states are entitled to extremely thin 
rights. States, for instance, have limited ability to raise counterclaims40 and 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Spoorenberg & Viñuales, supra note 28, at 98–100. 
 34 See id. at 97. 
 35 Id. at 95. 
 36 Id.; see Nilsson & Englesson, supra note 28, at 572; Christina Knahr, Annulment and Its 
Role in the Context of Conflicting Awards, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND RE-
ALITY, supra note 27, at 151, 162. 
 37 Decision of the Appointing Authority, Sir Robert Jennings, on the Challenge of Judge 
Bengt Broms (May 7, 2001), quoted in DAVID D. CARON & LEE F. CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION RULES: A COMMENTARY 5 (2013). 
 38 See Loretta Malintoppi & Natalie Limbasan, Living in Glass Houses? The Debate on 
Transparency in International Investment Arbitration, 2 BCDR INT’L ARB. REV. 32, 33–34, 36–
37 (2015). 
 39 See id. at 33–34, 47–48; see also Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 373, 375, 382, 406–12 (2010) (providing exam-
ples in which courts’ inability to grant access to information had negative consequences, possibly 
preventing justice, for the non-investor parties in investment treaty arbitration proceedings). 
 40 See August Reinisch, The Rule of Law in International Investment Arbitration, in RECON-
CEPTUALISING THE RULE OF LAW IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, RESOURCES, INVESTMENT AND 
TRADE 301 (Photini Pazartzis et al. eds., 2016); see also Christian Tietje & Kevin Crow, The Re-
form of Investment Protection Rules in CETA, TTIP and Other Recent EU-FTAs: Convincing? 9, 
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citizens have limited participatory rights (e.g., via submission of Amicus 
Briefs). Scholars and world leaders heavily debate the existence and prob-
lematic nature of this asymmetry.41 Some argue that the asymmetry is nec-
essary to remedy the lack of political rights of foreign corporations in do-
mestic policy.42 Nevertheless, this argument, beyond its naïveté, is rebutted 
by empirical studies, suggesting that foreign corporations generally have 
sufficient political capital in national politics.43 It is worth emphasizing that 
the problem is not only that the host state has limited rights, but also that the 
local communities and people affected by such investments have few, if 
any, rights. According to one study, community interests are often marginal-
ized in the system of investment law.44 This is highly problematic given that 
investments have effects, both positive and negative, on domestic popula-
tions. The lack of access to justice for local constituencies that are affected 
by such investments is thus unjustifiable. In this way, the asymmetry under-
pinning the system creates a fundamental clash between ISDS and the rule 
                                                                                                                           
16 (Dec. 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885279 (discussing the 
process to raise counterclaims). Nevertheless, in some cases counterclaims have been admitted. 
Cf. Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016) (Ur-
baser), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C255/DC9852_En.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/56D2-F9RZ]; Saluka Inv. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim (May 7, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0739.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKS8-GYBQ]. 
 41 See, e.g., Alessandra Arcuri, The Great Asymmetry and the Rule of Law in International 
Investment Arbitration, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2018 
(Lisa Sachs et al. eds., forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152808 [https://perma.cc/
4R39-4F9B]; Garcia et al., supra note 2, at 869–70 (2015); Kumm, supra note 6, at 5; Tietje & 
Crow, supra note 40, at 26–27. 
 42 For example, in an obiter the arbitral tribunal in Tecmed stated that “[o]n the basis of a number 
of legal and practical factors, it should be also considered that the foreign investor has a reduced or 
nil participation in the taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because the investors are not entitle 
[sic] to exercise political rights reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting for the authorities 
that will issue the decisions that affect such investors.” Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), http://
icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3785/DC4872_En.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8NP7-EVBL]; see Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 20 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 649, 662 (2017) (providing a recent iteration of this argument). 
 43 Wendy L. Hansen & Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political 
Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891, 
893, 894 (2000); David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy? Political Process and Interna-
tional Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 909, 937 (2010). See generally Emma Aisbett & 
Lauge Poulsen, Relative Treatment of Aliens: Firm Level Evidence from Developing Countries, 
(Glob. Econ. Governance Program, Working Paper No. 122, 2016), https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/
publication/geg-wp-2016122-relative-treatment-aliens-firm-level-evidence-developing-countries 
[https://perma.cc/T5C3-6BL5] (providing a recent empirical study that demonstrates that foreign 
investors are generally not being discriminated). 
 44 LORENZO COTULA & MIKA SCHRÖDER, COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 20 (2017). 
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of law.45 Given the strong commitment to the rule of law by the internation-
al law system,46 as well as by some of its major players,47 it is imperative to 
address this fundamental flaw of the investment law regime. 
C. Current Reforms and Developments 
Developments and reforms in the field show that some of the deficien-
cies of the current system are currently being addressed. For example, recent 
treaty practice has attempted to address the drawbacks related to the lack of 
transparency. The first step to increase the transparency of arbitral proceed-
ings was taken in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). In 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a 
note of interpretation stating that: 
Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality 
on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, sub-
ject to the application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA 
precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents 
submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal.48 
This note overturns the traditional approach to investment arbitration 
by stating that NAFTA arbitral proceedings are public unless expressly pro-
vided otherwise. It thus follows that all documents, such as the written 
pleadings of the parties, the orders of the tribunal, and the final awards, can 
be made public without the consent of the parties.49 Additionally, in 2003, 
the FTC issued another note to clarify the conditions under which non-
disputing party submission should be admitted.50 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Arcuri, supra note 41, at 10–16. 
 46 See G.A. Res. 67/1, Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
Rule of Law at the National and International Levels (Nov. 30, 2012). 
 47 See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 21, 2008 O.J. (C115) 
28–29. Article 21 states the following: 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.  
Id.  
 48 NAFTA Notes of Interpretation, supra note 3, ¶ A(1). 
 49 Malintoppi & Limbasan, supra note 38, at 41. 
 50 HOWARD MANN, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE FREE TRADE COMMISSION 
STATEMENTS OF OCTOBER 7, 2003, ON NAFTA’S CHAPTER 11: NEVER-NEVER LAND OR REAL 
PROGRESS? (2003), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/trade_ftc_comment_oct03.
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Two other important recent developments were the 2006 amendments to 
the ICSID Rules and the adoption of UNCITRAL’s Rules on Transparency in 
2014.51 These bodies of rules introduced an obligation to publish the excerpts 
of the arbitration decisions, regardless of the consent of the parties,52 as well 
as an obligation to publish the documents submitted by the parties during the 
arbitral proceedings, except for those containing confidential or protected in-
formation or information that could affect the respondent’s essential security 
interests.53 Second, the rules explicitly provide for an opportunity to admit 
non-disputing parties to oral hearings,54 as well as their written pleadings.55 
Moreover, IIAs also placed more emphasis on transparency56 by imposing the 
obligation on arbitral tribunals to make documents of the proceedings availa-
ble57 and the oral hearings publicly accessible, as well as by conferring on ar-
bitral tribunals the power to admit third-party submissions.58 
                                                                                                                           
pdf [https://perma.cc/L7F8-3H69]. Under this test, arbitral tribunals shall admit such submissions 
insofar as (i) they help them clarify the facts of case or the interpretation of the applicable rules, 
(ii) they concern issues falling within the scope of the dispute, (iii) they had a significant interest 
in arbitration, and (iv) the decision of the case involves public interest considerations. See Nigel 
Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitra-
tion?, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, supra note 27, at 253, 261. 
 51 See UNICTRAL, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBI-
TRATION (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-
on-Transparency-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q692-HP87] [herinafter UNICTRAL, RULES ON TRANS-
PARENCY]; ICSID, CONVENTION ARBITRATION RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 3. These 
transparency rules apply to disputes under IIAs entered into force after April 1, 2014, unless other-
wise provided by the parties. It follows that UNCITRAL rules on transparency applies automatically 
if a given IIA, which came into force after this date, refers to UNCITRAL arbitration rules. See Lise 
Johnson et al., International Investment Agreements: A Review of Trends and New Approaches, in 
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2013–2014, at 25, 61 (Andrea K. 
Bjorklund ed., 2014). See generally Shotaro Hamamoto, Le Règlement de la CNUDCI sur la Trans-
parence dans L’arbitrage Entre Investisseurs et États Fondé sur des Traités et la Convention de 
Maurice sur la Transparence—Commentaire Article par Article, 1 J. DROIT INT’L 5 (2016). 
 52 ICSID, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, RULE 48(4), at 122 
(2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20convention%20english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G2W2-Z6KJ]. 
 53 UNICTRAL, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 51, art. 7. 
 54 Id. art. 5; ICSID, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 52, 
art. 27(2). 
 55 See UNICTRAL, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 51, art. 5; ICSID, RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 52, art. 37(2). 
 56 See N. Jansen Calamita, Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe’s Evolving Investment 
Treaty Practice, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 645, 659–61 (2014). 
 57 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement art. 9.17, Austl.-China, June 17, 2015, https://dfat.gov.au/
trade/agreements/in-force/chafta/official-documents/Documents/chafta-agreement-text.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9SDR-4GWS]; Explanatory Materials for the Agreement on Economic Cooperation art. 27, 
N.Z.-Taiwan, July 10, 2013, https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/Upload/WebArchive/1266/%E5%8D
%94%E5%AE%9A%E5%90%84%E7%AB%A0%E7%AF%80%E4%BB%8B%E7%B4%B9-
%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87-20130710.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BR3-6K2Y]; Agreement for the Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments annex B, Can.-Czech, May 6, 2009, http://investment
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Although attempts to reform the ISDS system focused largely on its 
transparency issues, such reform efforts devoted far less attention to the sys-
tem’s other shortcomings.59 Notably, the questionable procedures for arbi-
trator selection remain unchanged and proposals to introduce an appellate 
review mechanism remain dead letter in most IIAs.60 Nevertheless, two rel-
evant exceptions to these otherwise lasting issues are the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union 
(CETA) and the free trade agreement between the European Union and Vi-
etnam. These two agreements adopt an investment dispute settlement mech-
anism, the Investment Court System (“ICS”), which attempts to remove the 
causes of pro-investor bias and of the overall inconsistency of arbitral deci-
sions.61 To this end, the agreements confer the power to nominate the adju-
dicators upon the Joint Committee, which is a body composed of represent-
atives of the contracting states. Further, the ICS envisages the establishment 
of an Appellate Tribunal, which may improve the coherence of the system.62 
These recent developments, although notable and commendable, are not 
extensive enough to have an impact on the investment protection regime as a 
whole. For instance, the ICS still maintains several features of the traditional 
investor-state arbitration, especially because the ICSID and UNCITRAL 
rules and facilities would still play an important role in the proceedings 
                                                                                                                           
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/606 [https://perma.cc/GD6S-RTXW]; Acuerdo sobre 
Promoción y Protección Cecíproca de Inversiones [Agreement on Reciprocal Investment Promotion 
and Protection] art. 26, Peru-Colomb., Dec. 11, 2007, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/798 [https://perma.cc/B5RG-DQEH]; Agreement on the Promotion and Recip-
rocal Protection of Investments art. 20, Mex.-Slovk., Oct. 26, 2007, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2002 [https://perma.cc/FD9V-ZTHT]; Agreement for the Promo-
tion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 18, Mex.-U.K., May 12, 2007, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2009 [https://perma.cc/KTW6-FMM9]. 
 58 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 31, Cameroon-
Can., Mar. 3, 2014, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3163 [https://
perma.cc/K92H-GU95]. 
 59 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Rukia Baruti, Transparency in Investor-State Arbitra-
tion: An Incremental Approach, 2 BCDR INT’L ARB. REV. 59, 75 (2015). 
 60 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2004 MODEL BIT art. 28, annex D (2004), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FKX-XZZJ] (model treaty); ICSID Secretari-
at, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 15, 17 (Oct. 22, 2004) (discus-
sion paper), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20Improvements%20
of%20the%20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR69-2Z4V]. 
This provision was introduced on the basis of the provisions of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act, which included the establishment of an appellate authority among the objectives of 
US trade policy. Id. 
 61 E.U.-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement arts. 15.1, 15.4, E.U.-Viet., June 25, 2018, http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157375.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3LQ-T428]; Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art 8.27, Can.-E.U., Sept. 21, 2017, http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8AP-V4LU]. 
 62 ICSID Secretariat, supra note 60, at 17. 
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conducted under these new rules.63 Moreover, for all their improvements, 
IIAs have maintained the lamented asymmetry. Only a limited number of 
model IIAs provide for investors’ obligations. The India Model Bilateral In-
vestment Treat (“BIT”) of 2015, for example, stipulates that investors are 
subject to “internationally recognized standards of corporate social respon-
sibility.”64 Similarly, the Southern African Development Community Model 
BIT Template65 imposes on investors the duty to respect human rights in the 
workplace, in the community, and in the host state where the investment is 
made. The same provision expands upon this obligation by referencing the 
International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights of Work and underlining that foreign investment must be made 
and managed in accordance with international environmental and human 
rights obligations.66 
Several IIAs between developing and emerging countries also include 
innovative features that partly address the asymmetrical nature of such 
agreements. For instance, the Morocco-Nigeria67 BIT of 2016 establishes 
that, in addition to carrying out a social and environmental impact assess-
ment on the basis of the relevant domestic legislation, the foreign investors 
shall conduct their businesses with a mindset of pursuing sustainable devel-
opment and fostering the well-being of local communities.68 Further, under 
the BIT, investors must act in accordance with the International Labour Or-
ganization’s Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Investment and Social 
Policy as well as with highest possible adherence to Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility standards.69 While these types of integration of obligations for 
investors in investment treaties is commendable, these reform efforts have 
                                                                                                                           
 63See id. at 23–24; Philip Hainbach, The EU’s Approach to Investor-State Arbitration in the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 13 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 33–34, 
(2016), https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2315 [https://perma.
cc/QF2S-L9JS]; Gus Van Harten, Key Flaws in the European Commission’s Proposals for Foreign 
Investor Protection in TTIP 2 (Osgoode Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 16/2016, Nov. 24, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692122 [https://perma.cc/4R7Z-USW6] [here-
inafter Van Harten, Key Flaws]. 
 64 See MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 12 (2015), http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3560 [https://perma.cc/6YJ8-49Y3]. 
 65 S. AFRICAN DEV. CMTY., MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE WITH COM-
MENTARY art. 15 (2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-
template-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L7X-JTW2]. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 5, art. 24. See generally Gazzini, supra note 5 (providing 
a brief overview and assessment of the BIT). 
 68 See Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 5, art. 24. It is also worth recalling that several other 
recent IIAs provide for similar clauses. See, e.g., Brazil-Mozambique ACFI, supra note 11, art. 
14. 
 69 Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 5, art. 24. 
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yet to establish effective enforcement mechanisms for investors’ obliga-
tions, leaving the problem of asymmetry partly unsolved.70 
D. Looking for the Public Soul of the International Investment Regime 
[T]he res publica is the property of the people. But a people is not any 
collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an 
assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with 
respect to justice and a partnership for the common good.  
—De Re Publica, 1, XXV, § 39, Cicero71 
Many of the flaws discussed above could be ascribed to the hybrid na-
ture of the ISDS system. This dispute settlement mechanism conflates a pri-
vate and a public dimension. The former is epitomized by the rules and pro-
cedures governing arbitral proceedings and the inherently private nature of 
the claimants. As is well known, investment arbitration is based on the com-
mercial arbitration model.72 Interestingly, though, virtually all investment dis-
putes directly or indirectly pertain to the exercise of public power and affect 
the public interest. The current system appears to grant investors the right to 
challenge the “regulatory fabric” of the host state73 and to arbitrators the “au-
thority to make what are in essence governmental decisions.”74 
In light of the asymmetrical nature of investment disputes, we echo an 
increasing body of literature, that advocates for reorienting investment dis-
pute towards the protection of public interests. A private mechanism to solve 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Under the previous unapproved draft of the India-Model BIT, it would have been possible 
to submit civil claims in the investor’s home state for liability regarding “acts, decisions or omis-
sions made in the Home State in relation to the Investment where such acts, decisions or omis-
sions lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the Host State” and the non-
compliance with the investors’ obligation would have given rise to the “denial of treaty benefits.” 
See Jesse Coleman & Kanika Gupta, India’s Revised Model BIT: Two Steps Forward, One Step 
Back?, INV. CLAIMS (Oct. 4, 2017), http://oxia.ouplaw.com/page/India-BIT [https://perma.cc/37V4-
TQTX]. 
 71 The original Latin sentence reads as follows: “Res publica res populi, populus autem non om-
nis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis 
communione sociatus.” Cicero, De Re Publica, 1, XXV, § 39 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Harvard 
Univ. Press ed. 2006) (c. 54 B.C.E.). The literal translation of res publica is “public thing,” but it is 
often translated in English as “commonwealth.” Res publica, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DIC-
TIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20publica [https://perma.cc/7B98-
KWPZ]. 
 72 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 125–27 (2006). 
 73 Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Invest-
ment Law, 36 PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2014). 
 74 Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 72, at 126. 
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disputes of eminently public nature is a dissonance. Although it is increasing-
ly more difficult to draw a clear line between private and public law, both at 
the domestic and international levels,75 we believe that this dichotomy re-
tains an explanatory potential in this context. Private and public law adjudi-
cation each presuppose different approaches, languages, and objectives.76 
Therefore, while acknowledging that the boundaries between public 
and private realms may be thin and somewhat elusive, we employ this di-
chotomy to emphasize the symbolic and normative value of the public di-
mension of (quasi-)legal institutions. Our use of the term public is thus 
meant in a socio-legal perspective, not a purely legal one. We conceive a 
public institution as one particularly aimed at protecting and promoting the 
public interest, as opposed to providing for a special privilege for a private 
or vested interest. It is from this vantage point that we advocate for a radical 
transformation of the international investment regimes, whereby they be-
come genuinely public. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS: OBLIGATIONS FOR INVESTORS AND 
RIGHTS TO THE CIVIL SOCIETY 
 To correct the asymmetry of the investment regime and make the core 
of investment law more genuinely public, countries should place the rights 
of investment-affected communities on par with those of investors. To do 
that, they must implement a two-fold set of reforms. The first prong of our 
proposal concerns the substantive rules governing investment disputes. This 
Part argues that future treaties should further the incipient tendency to im-
pose obligations on foreign investors and recognize civil society’s rights in 
such agreements. Section A argues that international investment treaties 
should impose more formal obligations for investors to consider human 
rights in their operations, such as by moving from the lax “clean hands doc-
trine” to stricter human rights provisions.77 Section B suggests that treaties 
should incorporate the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights to a greater extent.78 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 
390 (1999). 
 76 See Alex Mills, The Public-Private Dualities of International Investment Law and Arbitra-
tion, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 97, 98 (Chester Brown & 
Kate Miles eds., 2011) [hereinafter EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW]. 
 77 See infra notes 79–88 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 89–110 and accompanying text. 
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A. From Clean Hands to Human Rights 
Admittedly, many treaties provide for the obligation to abide by the host 
state’s laws. Building on this provision, some arbitral tribunals have even 
concocted the so-called “clean hands doctrine.”79 Nevertheless, the contours 
and the effects of such treaty clauses remain quite nebulous.80 States should 
clarify the status of this obligation, by including in new treaty texts specific 
provisions that list among investors’ other obligations their full respect of rel-
evant domestic law requirements. Similar provisions could in turn allow in-
vestment-affected individuals or groups of individuals to invoke an investor’s 
alleged violation of domestic legislation, particularly human rights, labor, and 
environmental laws as part of their claims. 
Of course, such provisions would likely hold little or no significance 
where the host state’s laws do not set sufficiently high human rights, labor, 
or environmental standards.81 Therefore, foreign investors, in the conduct of 
their business, should also be subject to international human rights, labor, 
and environmental obligations. As observed above, recent treaty practice is 
beginning to move towards the inclusion of such obligations in IIAs.82 Still, 
some of these provisions adopt a hortative language, which states that for-
eign investors merely “should,” rather than “shall,” comply with a wide 
range of international obligations.83 
Similarly, contemporary arbitral jurisprudence appears to embrace a 
more balanced view of international investment law.84 Based on its interpre-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Patrick Dumberry, State of Confusion: The Doctrine of “Clean Hands” in Investment 
Arbitration After the Yukos Award, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 229, 229–230 (2016) (explaining 
that the “clean hands doctrine” states that “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands”). 
 80 It is debated whether illegal conduct by the foreign investor amounts to a jurisdictional issue, a 
question of admissibility, or a question of merit. See Zachary Douglas, The Plea of Illegality in In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration, 29 ICSID REV. 155, 155, 167 (2014); Andrew Newcombe, Investor 
Misconduct: Jurisdiction, Admissibility, or Merits?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW, 
supra note 76, at 187. See generally Dumberry, supra note 79. 
 81 Ursula Kriebaum, Human Rights of the Population of the Host State in International In-
vestment Arbitration, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 661, 667–71 (2009). 
 82 See supra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
 83 See, e.g., Morocco-Nigeria BIT, supra note 5, art. 24(1) (stating only that investors “should 
strive to make the maximum feasible contributions to the sustainable development of the host 
State and local community”). 
 84 See Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Perú, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award: Par-
tial Dissenting Opinion of Philippe Sands QC, at 2, 6 (Nov. 30, 2017), http://icsidfiles.world
bank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3745/DS10808_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBB6-
ZPRH]; Urbaser, ¶ 1193; Joshua Paine, Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Republic of Peru: Judging 
the Social License of Foreign Investments and Applying New Style Investment Treaties, ICSID REV., 
1–9 (forthcoming 2018); Markus Krajewski, Human Rights in International Investment Law: Re-
cent Trends in Arbitration and Treaty-Making Practice (Apr. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
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tation of the Argentina-Spain BIT, the ICSID tribunal in Urbaser v. Argen-
tina first observed that the BIT should not be read in isolation from other 
sources of international law, including human rights obligations.85 With this 
in mind, the tribunal took a further momentous step by affirming that such 
obligations do not apply exclusively to states, but also apply to bind private 
parties. Notably, the ICSID tribunal stated that “it is therefore to be admit-
ted that the human right for everyone’s dignity and its right for adequate 
housing and living conditions are complemented by an obligation on all 
parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at destroy-
ing such rights.”86 Although the Urbaser tribunal eventually rejected the re-
spondent’s counterclaim alleging the violation of human rights obligations, 
the ruling clearly demonstrated that times are ripe for a paradigm shift in 
investment treaty making. 
The inclusion of a bundle of investors’ international obligations is like-
ly to usher in a new era in the settlement of investment disputes. Building 
on the experience of these recent model treaties, future investment treaties 
should incorporate the most authoritative legal sources on business and hu-
man rights. 
B. Incorporating the UN Guiding Principles into Investment Treaty Law 
The main legal instruments in the realm of business and human rights 
are the United Nations Guiding Principles (“UNGPs”),87 the United Nations 
Global Compact88 and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises.89 
These international instruments articulate the contours of corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights. 
The UNGPs are the set of principles that arguably best reflects the cur-
rent agreement at the international and transnational level of the role of hu-
man rights in relation to the conduct of business.90 Parts I and II of the 
                                                                                                                           
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133529 [https://perma.cc/YJW9-K69C] (examining such jurisprudence in 
detail). 
 85 Urbaser, ¶¶ 1186–1192. 
 86 Id. ¶ 1199. 
 87 See generally UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/52PT-H78L] [hereinafter UN GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES]. 
 88 See generally UN GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ [https://perma.
cc/2RTL-ETFU]. 
 89 See generally OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4WP-SHMZ] [hereinafter 2011 OECD 
GUIDELINES]. 
 90 Professor John G. Ruggie, Harvard University, has drawn attention to the fact that the 
UNGPs have been informed by “thick stakeholder consensus.” See John G. Ruggie, Life in the 
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UNGP, addressing “the State duty to protect human rights” and “the corpo-
rate responsibility to respect human rights” respectively, enunciate a suffi-
ciently clear body of substantive law to frame the responsibilities of states 
and corporations vis-à-vis the civil society in the context of investment rela-
tions.91 There seem to be no legitimate reasons why states, who generally 
advocate for more rule of law, should take issue with endorsing these prin-
ciples in their future investment treaties.92 In addition, several third-world 
countries are very supportive of the UNGPs to the extent that it has helped 
launch the establishment of an inter-governmental working group with the 
mandate to “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regu-
late, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corpo-
rations and other business enterprises.”93 Another important initiative to 
strengthen the protection of human rights in the context of business opera-
tions is the recent launch of a platform to create arbitration for disputes in-
volving business and human rights.94 
Against this background, our proposal may appear as part of a broader 
trend aspiring at the establishment of more inclusive legal institutions regu-
lating transnational business transactions. Embedding Parts I and II of the 
UNGPs in future investment treaties could bridge the gap between the busi-
ness and human rights regime and the investment treaties regime.95 Never-
theless, there are some concerns about turning the UNGPs into binding law. 
                                                                                                                           
Global Public Domain: Response to Commentaries on the UN Guiding Principles and the Pro-
posed Treaty on Business and Human Rights (Jan. 23, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2554726. 
 91 See generally UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 87. 
 92 The promotion of the rule of law is one of the often-discussed justifications for internation-
al investment law. See Benjamin K. Guthrie, Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of 
the Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1151, 1166, 1167 (2013); Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A 
Critical Discussion, 2 TRADE L. & DEV. 19 (2010). 
 93 UN Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally Binding In-
strument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human 
Rights, at 2 (June 26, 2014), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/776246/files/A_HRC_26_L.22_
Rev.1-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RKE-RTLR]. 
 94 See Catherine Dunmore, International Arbitration of Business and Human Rights Disputes: 
Part 1 and Part 2, ASSER INST.: DOING BUS. RIGHT BLOG (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.asser.nl/
DoingBusinessRight/Blog/post/international-arbitration-of-business-and-human-rights-disputes-
part-1-introducing-the-proposal [https://perma.cc/A3Q9-3FH8] (providing an overview of the 
proposal). 
 95 Past proposals by both scholars and non-governmental organizations have explicitly refer-
enced international instruments on business and human rights. See, e.g., INT’L INSTITUTIONAL SUS-
TAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 11 (Apr. 2005), www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WZN3-ZLMN]. Our proposal includes Part I of the UNGPs because we also envi-
sion the inclusion of obligations for the host state. 
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This Essay addresses those concerns below, particularly by discussing the al-
ternative grievance mechanisms that may ensure access to remedies. For now, 
it suffices to emphasize that one of the advantages of our proposal is that the 
dispute resolution mechanism—whatever form it may take—would be open 
to both investors and civil society. The same regime would combine inves-
tors’ standards of protection, as currently articulated in investment treaties, 
with a range of guarantees for the individuals or group of individuals affect-
ed by the investment. In this way, the UNGPs would operate in a context in 
which each separate interest has a distinct voice and comparable rights as 
the others. 
On a substantive level, there are several potential criticisms of the 
UNGPs. For example, the UNGPs often contain somewhat vague and over-
broad concepts, such as the requirement of “due diligence” by corpora-
tions.96 In response to this criticism, general clauses and other vaguely de-
fined concepts are quite common in international investment law. Suffice it 
to mention in this regard the fair and equitable treatment clause.97 In pass-
ing, it is also worth noting that due diligence is no stranger to the regime of 
investment treaties.98 Several investment arbitration tribunals have implicit-
ly or explicitly referred to due diligence of investors.99  
In the context of business and human rights, the 2012 Joint Interpreta-
tive Note of the Global Compact and the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights provided some guidance on this issue.100 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See ILA STUDY GRP. ON DUE DILIGENCE IN INT’L LAW, SECOND REPORT (July 2016), 
http://ww.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups [https://perma.cc/7UHU-379E] (providing a general 
discussion of due diligence in international law as well as a discussion of “due diligence and busi-
ness activities”). 
 97 For example, investment treaties often include a “fair and equitable treatment clause.” See 
generally Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 
INT’L LAW., Spring 2005, at 87; OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Working Paper No. 2004/3, 
2004) http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2004_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/93EN-
L97G] [hereinafter OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment]. Additionally, “due diligence” re-
quirements are often used in international investment treaties. In adjudicating disputes, several 
investment arbitration tribunals have also implicitly or explicitly referred to due diligence obliga-
tions of investors. See OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra. 
 98 See De Brabandere, supra note 5, at 320. 
 99 See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 374–391 (July 24, 2008), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C67/DC1589_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8WH-UL6S]; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Ro-
mania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Final Award (Oct. 17, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6Y4-Z9VX]. 
 100 See generally UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CORPO-
RATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE (2012) https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/783Z-8GHD] 
[hereinafter UN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE 2012]. 
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practice of OECD National Contact Points (“NCP”) sought to clarify this 
concern.101 For example, in the United Kingdom NCP case of RAID v. DAS 
Air in 2004, an airline company was accused of transporting coltan from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The company defended itself by denying 
knowledge about the sources of the material transported.102 In this case the 
due diligence that the UK NCP found DAS should have exercised is a norm 
coming for the UN’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.103 It is al-
so through ambiguities that important legal concepts develop and the schol-
arly work on due diligence for corporations may bear witness to such fruit-
ful development.104 Finally, future international investment arbitration case 
law is likely to further elucidate a due diligence requirement. Moreover, 
such a requirement in international investment treaties can be viewed as a 
key balancing mechanism, attenuating the problems that may arise in situa-
tions where corporations have very reduced space to realize human rights. 
One argument against holding corporations responsible for human rights vi-
olations is that they often would lack the powers or rights needed for that 
purpose.105 Due diligence requirements can thus lift the corporations from 
unreasonable and unjustified expectations vis-à-vis their responsibilities. 
Guiding Principle 17(b) explicitly provides that human rights due diligence 
“[w]ill vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the risk 
of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context of its opera-
tions.”106 Reference to “the nature and the context of the operation” could 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See infra notes 133–145 and accompanying text (providing a brief discussion of National 
Contact Points). 
 102 The United Kingdom NCP held that the airline company “undertook insufficient due dili-
gence on the supply chain,” particularly by not trying to establish “the source of the minerals they 
were transporting.” Cf. RAID v. Das Air, Statement by the UK NCP for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Das Air, ¶¶ 44, 49 (July 17, 2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
44479531.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG9X-2QCL]. 
 103 See generally UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 87 (explaining how to implement the 
UN’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework). 
 104 See generally Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of “Due Dili-
gence” in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 899 
(2017) [hereinafter Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, Due Diligence] (highlighting perceived ambigui-
ties in the UNGP); John Gerard Ruggie & John F. Sherman, III, The Concept of “Due Diligence” 
in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and 
Robert McCorquodale, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921 (2017) [hereinafter Ruggie & Sherman, Reply]  
(responding to the observations in Bonnitcha & McCorquodale, Due Diligence, supra); see also 
Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the UN Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Rejoinder to John Gerard Ruggie and John F. 
Sherman, III, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 929 (2017) (responding to the analysis in Ruggie & Sherman, 
Reply, supra). 
 105 See generally John Douglas Bishop, The Limits of Corporate Human Rights Obligations 
and the Rights of For-Profit Corporations, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 119, 122 (2012). 
 106 UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 87, art. 17(b). 
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be read in the future as a placeholder for a norm that enables balancing the 
concrete possibilities that a corporation has to respect human rights as one 
of their responsibilities.107 
The UNGPs are also subject to criticism for being both under- and 
over-comprehensive. On the one hand, the UNGPs do not explicitly refer to 
all the areas covered by the UN Global Compact Ten Principles and by the 
OECD Guidelines.108 For example, the UNGPs have no specific rules relat-
ing to corruption or taxation. Although it may factually be accurate to say 
that they cover a narrower set of issues than the Global Compact and the 
OECD Guidelines, this is not necessarily a problem. It may, in fact, be more 
politically feasible to embed a somewhat less ambitious, but more widely 
agreed upon instrument for this purpose. Certainly, OECD Members could 
be more ambitious and try harder to integrate the OECD Guidelines in new 
investment treaties. What this Essay argues is that the UNGPs could func-
tion as the common denominator for redrafting the substantive applicable 
law in new investment treaties. 
At the same time, the UNGPs may be considered overambitious be-
cause they refer to all human rights, without setting distinct boundaries as to 
which human rights should be respected by corporations. The latter criti-
cism could be extended to all the other international instruments on busi-
ness and human rights because they all take this broad approach.109 The 
main reason for these instruments’ addressing all internationally recognized 
human rights is that “business enterprises can have an impact—directly or 
indirectly—on virtually the entire spectrum of these rights.”110 By singling 
out one set of rights, the new treaties might miss out on important dimen-
sions of the business-human rights linkage. In this sense, a broad reference 
to human rights should not be considered problematic, but instead a desira-
ble aspect of investment treaties. 
III. REALIZING RIGHTS: PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE COMPLAINT  
MECHANISMS AS THE NEW GAME IN TOWN 
The second pillar of this Essay’s proposed reform project concerns the 
dispute settlement mechanism. In our view, a rethinking of the architecture of 
dispute settlement is necessary to obliterate the asymmetric nature of the in-
                                                                                                                           
 107 See id. 
 108 See generally OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 89; The Ten Principles of the UN Global 
Compact, UN GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles 
[https://perma.cc/T2QC-X3SZ]. 
 109 Cf. UN GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 108 (specifically Principles 1 and 2); OECD 
GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 31–34. 
 110 See UN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE 2012, supra note 100, at 12–13. 
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ternational investment regime. Going beyond the current investor-state arbi-
tration system, however, requires some imaginative effort. A survey of the 
current international treaty practice offers some fecund hints. For example, a 
growing number of conventional instruments opt for non-judicial dispute set-
tlement mechanisms, administered by public or quasi-public bodies. Although 
these mechanisms differ in many respects, they share a common objective: 
securing the accountability of non-state actors, particularly international insti-
tutions and corporations.111 For the sake of conciseness, these instruments can 
be christened Public Alternative Complaint Mechanisms (“PACoMs”).  
Before looking into the possible application of the alternative dispute 
settlements in the context of international investment treaties, it is worth 
pausing to examine the main features and functions of PACoMs in interna-
tional and transnational law. This Part offers a brief overview of two repre-
sentative examples of PACoMs: ombudsbodies and the OECD NCPs. Sec-
tion A focuses on ombudsbodies,112 which could be considered as the fore-
runners of all PACoMs.113 Ombudsbodies are proliferating in the interna-
tional field and offer protection to individuals, which otherwise would have 
little to no voice vis-à-vis international organizations. Section B of this Part 
discusses the OECD NCPs, which have been launched on the premise that 
multinational corporations play a key role in the global economy and should 
accordingly bear responsibility for their actions.114 Above all, these grievance 
mechanisms constitute key institutional innovations to afford protection to the 
public interest, particularly when such interest is under-represented.115 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See, e.g., UN DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOC-
RACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD (2002). 
 112 The term “ombusbody” is our own. The office is generally referred to as “Ombudsman.” 
Beside its clear gender bias, the word fails to capture the idea that it is more than one person ena-
bling the office to work. When we refer to specific institutions, we use the official name, which 
indeed is often Ombudsman. Nevertheless, we will adhere to our nomenclature whenever the term 
is used in the abstract. 
 113 See infra notes 116–132 and accompanying text. 
 114 See infra notes 133–145 and accompanying text. 
 115 A full overview of these institutions is beyond the scope of this Essay. It is worth mention-
ing, however, that PACoMs have also proliferated in the context of International Financial Institu-
tions. The most notable example is the World Bank Inspection Panel (“Panel”). Established in 
1993, the Panel is a grievance mechanism to the avail of the project-affected people. In its short 
life, the Panel has heard more than 100 cases. While the Panel opinions are non-binding, they have 
often led to a change in the policy of the Bank. Ole Kristian Fauchald, Hardening the Legal Soft-
ness of the World Bank Through an Inspection Panel?, 58 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 101, 102, 
107 (2013). 
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A. Ombudsbodies 
The origins of ombudsbodies date back to the eighteenth century. The 
first ombudsman-fashioned institution was established in Sweden with the 
aim of overseeing other state officials and ensuring the observance of laws 
and statutes.116 These bodies gradually became completely independent 
from the king and executive branch because independence was both a 
source of legitimacy and a prerequisite for the appropriate and complete 
discharge of the duties of the ombudsman. The notion of Ombudsman even-
tually became protean over time and now encompasses a rather diverse ar-
ray of bodies—including non-governmental ones—that both deal with indi-
vidual complaints and carry out a wide variety of control functions.117 
 An example of the type of functions that human rights ombudsbodies 
now perform include their particularly important role in advancing the hu-
man rights and rule of law culture of newly democratic states. In some in-
stances, the ombudsman-like institutions have even acted as the only demo-
cratic body and human rights agency in states with semi-authoritarian gov-
ernments.118 More widely, the ombudsman is regarded as an instrument to 
ensure good governance and the respect of the rule of law.119 The growing 
importance of such mechanisms at the international level has much to do 
with the transformation of the international legal order. The classic concep-
tion of international law, according to which international law is the body of 
rules applicable to states (“Law of Nations”),120 became outdated in the 
mid-1900s. In the second half of the twentieth century, the number and im-
portance of international organizations grew at an exponential rate.121 Such 
organizations continue to operate in a vast array of fields and are generally 
endowed with penetrating powers. Owing to their ever-increasing scope, 
international organizations and international treaties tend to impact not only 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See Sten Rudholm, Existing Ombudsman Systems: Sweden’s Guardians of the Law: The 
Chancellor of Justice, in THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN’S DEFENDER 17, 17–22 (Donald C. Rowat 
ed., 1968); Bertil Wennergren, The Rise and Growth of Swedish Institutions for Defending the 
Citizen Against Official Wrongs, 377 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (1968). 
 117 See LINDA C. Reif, THE OMBUDSMAN, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 59–62 (2004). 
 118 See, e.g., Thomas Pegram, Accountability in Hostile Times: The Case of the Peruvian Hu-
man Rights Ombudsman 1996–2001, 40 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 51, 60 (2008) (explaining how in 
Peru, the Defensoría Civil controlled and restrained the Fujimori government regarding human 
rights requirements to some extent). 
 119 John McMillan, The Ombudsman and the Rule of Law 1–16 (Jan. 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AIAdminLawF/2005/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T5D9-5CPL]. 
 120 See generally EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 47 (1758). 
 121 CHITTARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2005). 
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on the conduct of inter-state relations, but also the day-to-day life of indi-
viduals within those countries. In light of these transformations, the protec-
tion of individual rights has become one of the main areas of development 
of international law.122 As Hersch Lauterpach famously put it, the post-
World War II international legal system has turned the individual from an 
“object of international compassion into a subject of international rights.”123 
Although the international legal personality of individuals still remains an 
unsettled question,124 much of the world accepts that individuals possess 
some degree of international subjectivity.125 Against this backdrop, the rise 
of complaint mechanisms is easily explained as an attempt to strengthen the 
legitimacy of international organizations and international regimes more 
generally by striving for more effective accountability and, ultimately, for 
good governance.126 
A look at the international practice shows that ombudsbodies have 
been used to secure the transition to peace and stability in post-conflict con-
texts. The Kosovo ombudsbody is a case in point. The establishment of 
such an institution was part of the broader mission by the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) to restore democratic insti-
tution in the country and promote human rights.127 Notably, it was entrusted 
with the duty to review alleged abuses of authority of executive, legislative, 
and judicial bodies in Kosovo and to ensure the observance of the civil and 
political rights contained in the main human rights treaties. The competence 
of the ombudsbody encompasses cases of both illegality and maladministra-
tion that originated from the conduct of executive, legislative, and judicial 
bodies.128 The powers of this ombudsbody include, amongst others, tender-
ing good offices, conducting investigations, making recommendations, and 
                                                                                                                           
 122 FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUÑA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN EVOLVING 
GLOBAL SOCIETY: CONSTITUTIONALIZATION, ACCESSIBILITY, PRIVATIZATION 51–53 (2012). 
 123 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1950). 
 124 See generally ANNE PETERS, BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) (discussing the emerging concept of international rights of 
individual persons, as opposed to the older concept of international law protecting persons); Andrew 
Clapham, The Role of the Individual in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25 (2010) (discussing 
the possibility of international civil, and not only criminal, law obligations of individuals). 
 125 ORREGO VICUÑA, supra note 122, at 52. 
 126 Henk Addink, Good Governance: A Principle of International Law, in WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? LIBER AMICORUM A.H.A. SOONS 288, 301–03 (Cedric Ryngaert et 
al. eds., 2015); REIF, supra note 117, at 62, 66. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Good Govern-
ance, in 4 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 516 (Rudiger Wolfrum 
ed., 2015) (discussing the concept of good governance). 
 127 REIF, supra note 117, at 275. 
 128 Id. at 277. 
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issuing opinions on the compatibility of domestic legislation with interna-
tional human rights standards. 
In contrast, some international ombudsbodies only have “internal com-
petence.” The UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) introduced 
ombudsbodies to deal with employment disputes. For instance, the WHO 
ombudsman may deploy a wide range of soft instruments, such as providing 
advice or mediation, to settle and avoid complaints concerning employment 
conditions and the relations between employees.129 
The UN also established a complaint mechanism to address the criti-
cism drawn by its targeted sanctions regimes. Following the 9/11 terroristic 
attacks, the UN Security Council used the basis of the powers set out in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to impose individual sanctions on physical 
and legal persons affiliated or linked to al-Qaida or other Islamic terroristic 
organizations. To address these concerns and avoid jeopardizing its repres-
sive action, the UN created the Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL 
(Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee,130 which was entrusted with 
the power to handle delisting claims from affected individuals and entities. 
To be sure, the power to allow the delisting lies with the Sanction Commit-
tee. Nevertheless, the Ombudsperson’s recommendation may certainly in-
fluence the final decision of the Committee. 
More recently, ombudsbodies have also featured in IIAs. The 2015 
Brazil Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements provide for the 
establishment of an ombudsman (also called ‘National Focal Point’), which 
can receive complaints from investors or the other party.131 Such a body is 
meant to facilitate the solution of controversies, and its main responsibility is 
to provide “support for the investor of the other party.”132 We thus cannot help 
but recognize this newly conceived institution as an indication that the times 
are ripe for the kind of institutional innovation we advocate for in this Essay. 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Id. at 342. 
 130 The Office of the Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, 
UN OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSPERSON OF THE SEC. COUNCIL’S 1267 COMM., https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/en/ombudsperson [https://perma.cc/JR68-533W]. 
 131 See José Henrique Vieira Martins, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agree-
ments (CFIA) and Recent Developments, INV. TREATY NEWS (June 12, 2017), https://www.iisd.
org/itn/2017/06/12/brazils-cooperation-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-developments-
jose-henrique-vieira-martins/#_edn5 [https://perma.cc/HTA7-ZNMN] (providing a commentary on 
the 2015 Brazil Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements). 
 132 Cf. COOPERATION AND FACILITATION INVESTMENT AGREEMENT, art. 18 (2015), http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4786 [https://perma.cc/L5H7-TFU8] [herein-
after BRAZIL MODEL CFIA] (model agreement). 
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B. National Contact Points and the OECD Guidelines for  
Multinational Enterprises 
The 1976 OECD Ministerial Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises included an Annex with a set of recommenda-
tions for multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) (i.e., the original OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises).133 This original setup, recogniz-
ing contextually the rights and responsibilities of investors, shows how the 
nexus between the protection of investments and protection of those affect-
ed by investment activities was recognized early on in the international in-
vestment regime. Since then, the investment regime has evolved on two 
parallel tracks: on the one hand, the hard-law BITs, and on the other hand, 
the soft-law regimes for responsible investments. Today, the OECD Guide-
lines have become one of the cornerstones of this soft-law regime.134 In 
1984, in order to promote the Guidelines as well as to solve conflicts that 
may arise regarding their implementation, OECD Members agreed to estab-
lish NCPs.135 NCPs are institutions set up at the domestic level that can take 
different institutional forms, including panels of experts, bodies composed 
of representatives of competent ministries, and bodies including business 
and NGO representatives.136 
The caseload of the NCPs has increased exponentially, reaching almost 
four hundred specific cases in 2017.137 Although only OECD Members can 
establish NCPs, the outreach of these bodies extends beyond OECD mem-
bership because an instance can be brought against an OECD-MNE operat-
ing in non-OECD countries.138 Although not all cases successfully solved 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See generally John Gerard Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges 
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Working Paper, No. 15-045, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2601922 [https://perma.cc/3BTH-KYEC] (providing a brief history of the Guide-
lines). 
 134 Cf. 2011 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 89. 
 135 See OECD, SECOND REVISED DECISION OF THE COUNCIL ON THE GUIDELINES FOR MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 28 (1984), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/50024913.pdf [https://perma.
cc/D5LJ-XNTA]; see also 2011 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 68. 
 136 See 2011 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 71 (discussing procedural guidance for 
NCPs). 
 137 In 2017, the case load included more than 200 concluded, 122 rejected, and 26 pending cases. 
See Database of Specific Instances, OECD, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/database/ [https://
perma.cc/KD54-G5YU] [hereinafter OECD Database] (providing statistics of NCP specific instanc-
es). 
 138 See, for example, the many cases brought against corporations operating in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Cases can be consulted at the OECD Database, supra note 137. 
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the respective problem,139 NCPs’ decisions have yielded significant results 
overall.140 The bulk of cases relate to employment and industrial relations 
(44%), the environment (20%), and few cases have addressed issues relat-
ing to taxation (2%).141 
The distribution of cases among NCPs has been uneven: in some coun-
tries, NCPs investigations were never initiated, while in others, the mecha-
nisms are frequently invoked, with the UK NCP being one of the most ac-
tive.142 The fact that in fourteen member countries the NCP has never been 
activated—and that in some members only one or two NCPs instances have 
been initiated—has been read as sign of weakness of the highly decentral-
ized system of NCPs.143 Arguably, in some countries NCPs are ineffective 
because they lack minimum standards of independence and impartiality. 
Additionally, the lack of enforceability of the NCPs’ reports remain prob-
lematic:  
[W]ith one single exception, no government has publicly stated 
that non-cooperation by a company with an NCP or a negative 
finding against a company will have any material consequences 
imposed by a government. Forty years of pure voluntarism should 
be a long enough period of time to conclude that it cannot be 
counted on to do the job by itself.144 
Despite these deficiencies, NCPs have significantly contributed to clari-
fy the scope of investors’ obligations in the context of the OECD Guidelines. 
As is the case for most grievance systems, NCPs can be seen as both co-
producing standards for MNEs and strengthening their legal normativity.145 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See, e.g., Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth vs Shell, OECD WATCH, https://
www.oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_244 [https://perma.cc/6KN7-FHNS] (discussing the specific in-
stance involving Royal Dutch Shell Company and its pollution in the Niger Delta). 
 140 See generally Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 104 (providing data and assessments on the 
effectiveness of NCPs). 
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 142 See SHELLEY MARSHALL, CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY RES., OECD NATIONAL CONTACT 
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publications-en/Publication_4201/@@download/fullfile/Remedy%20Remains%20Rare.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D2UV-NL53]. 
 145 See Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 133, at 20. 
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IV. ACCESS TO REMEDIES: ENFORCING INVESTMENT-AFFECTED PEOPLE’S 
RIGHTS IN THE INVESTMENT REGIME 
The ongoing attempts to enhance the transparency, coherence, and in-
tegrity of the investment-treaty arbitration are commendable and should 
continue. We contend, however, that the most daunting challenge for cor-
recting the asymmetry of the international investment regime remains en-
suring proper enforcement of the human rights of the investment-affected 
individuals. Most of the reforms proposed—as well as those partly real-
ized—have eluded this fundamental question. The previous section briefly 
demonstrated how the international law system has started to respond to the 
need to protect people’s rights by establishing new grievance mechanisms. 
This trend should be inspirational in the field of international investment 
law, especially if the field wants to be faithful to the aspiration of further 
development and rule of law for all. 
This Part briefly sketches three model solutions to fix this fundamental 
flaw of the investment regime. Section A of this Part discusses the first 
model, which implies the disposal of investment arbitration in favor of soft-
law grievance mechanisms.146 Section B explains the second model, which 
retains investment arbitration, but enables investment-affected individuals 
to claim the violation of human rights, labor, and environmental standards 
in the context of investment arbitration.147 Under both models, the grievance 
mechanism (be it a PACoM or arbitration) would be equally available to in-
vestors and investment-affected people. Section C discusses the realm be-
tween these two proposals, in which several hybrid or multi-layered systems 
could be imagined, and which we cluster under the label of “networked 
grievance systems.”148 
A. PACoMs as an Alternative to Investment-Treaty Arbitration 
PACoMs could replace investment arbitration as an instrument to solve 
investment disputes. Ombudsperson-fashioned mechanisms could hear 
claims of investors, states, and investment-affected individuals. Under this 
system, it would be of critical importance to establish a truly independent 
body. As discussed in earlier sections,149 PACoMs are not always independ-
ent. The experience with the NCPs shows that they can be dysfunctional at 
times.150 This is why the rules governing the selection and the appointment 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See infra notes 149–155 and accompanying text. 
 147 See infra notes 156–165 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text. 
 149 See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 133, at 20. 
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of the ombudsperson should ensure his or her impartiality, independence, 
and professionalism. Unlike arbitral tribunals, these bodies would not ren-
der a binding award, but would seek to lead parties to find a mutually satis-
factory solution. Although the report issued by an ombudsbody would be 
barren of binding effects, it could support a legal action before the host 
state’s courts. 
This proposed solution is similar to the one endorsed in the 2015 Bra-
zil Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement, whereby two bod-
ies—a Joint Committee or an ombudsman/National Focal Point—are en-
trusted with the responsibility to manage and solve disputes.151 Under this 
model investment treaty, however, the ombudsman only addresses the com-
plaints of the investors or the other party. What we advocate would also 
broaden the competence of such bodies and entitle them to hear complaints 
from the investment-affected communities as well. This proposal may be 
difficult to realize, but it has several likely benefits. First, it would save on 
the gigantic costs of the arbitration mechanisms, which in themselves could 
be seen as a threat to democracy. Second, such procedures tend to be easier, 
faster, and more accessible to a broader public.152 Finally, the type of me-
diation conducted by these bodies is also likely to facilitate cooperation at 
early stages, free exchange of information, and possibly the achievement of 
mutually acceptable solutions. 
Nevertheless, the non-binding nature of these procedures remains 
highly controversial.153 A non-binding report would be toothless in contexts 
where the rule of law is poor (insufficient or ineffective), and this may 
sound particularly worrying to investors. At the same time, and in contrast 
with what academics often argue, exposing investors to a poor rule of law 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Cf. BRAZIL MODEL CFIA, supra note 132, arts. 17(4)(e), 18. Such a body is also provided for 
in the MERCOSUR Protocol. See Facundo Pérez-Aznar & Henrique Choer Moraes, The MER-
COSUR Protocol on Investment Cooperation and Facilitation: Regionalizing an Innovative Ap-
proach to Investment Agreements, EJIL:TALK! (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
mercosur-protocol-on-investment-cooperation-and-facilitation-regionalizing-an-innovative-approach-
to-investment-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/YHP6-B3R3]. 
 152 NCPs, for example, tend to offer “simpler and relatively quicker alternative” to judicial 
dispute resolution. See Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 133, at 20. 
 153 See, e.g., Alfred de Zayas, quoted in UN Expert Urges World Bank to Amend Its Constitution 
to Effectively Advance Human Rights, UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 
14, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22064&Lang
ID=E [https://perma.cc/S8Q9-YKSV] (discussing an interview with expert Alfred de Zayas, and not-
ing that “Mr. de Zayas said the World Bank’s existing accountability mechanisms—the Inspection 
Panel and the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman—did very valuable work, but he regretted that their 
recommendations were not binding”); see also Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 133, at 21. A similar 
problem has been noted in the context of systems of private certification and corporate social respon-
sibility. See generally TIM BARTLEY, RULES WITHOUT RIGHTS: LAND, LABOR AND PRIVATE AU-
THORITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018). 
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system may be beneficial for the rule of law of the host country. Research 
has shown how international arbitration “also has the potential to sideline 
the domestic construction of the rule of law and the work of human rights 
promoters.”154 From this vantage point, a system in which the negative ef-
fects of poor rule of law are equally felt by the civil society and investors 
could arguably put more pressure on governments to improve their judiciar-
ies, as well as other branches or agencies of their government. 
More importantly, a non-binding but well-functioning grievance mech-
anism could help gather awareness around the existence and violation of 
certain rights and may lead to their future clarification and realization. As 
argued by Stefano Rodotà: 
To proclaim a right . . . does not mean to ensure respect, applica-
tion, effectiveness . . . It is an uphill road, a slow process. . . . But, 
let us not cede to the temptation, masked by realism, to assert that 
that until a right is not fully enforceable, it is as if it does not ex-
ist. How many times, by just being written down in an instrument, 
it has been possible to denounce the non-application of a right, to 
name the scandal of its violation, to let the bad conscience of 
those who deny that right to surface, creating in this way the po-
litical condition to forcefully ask for its effective protection?155 
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration for All 
If investment treaty arbitration is to be retained, it should be reformed 
to ensure that investment-affected people also have a voice in the system.156 
Next to investors’ claims, arbitral tribunals would be thus able to hear com-
plaints of private individuals, communities of individuals, and possibly 
NGOs on such persons’ behalf regarding alleged breaches of domestic law 
and human rights related to foreign investments. This proposal resounds 
with the proposal for the International Business and Human Rights Arbitra-
tion (“IBHRA”).157 It differs from the IBHRA proposal, however, in that we 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Mark Fathi Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian 
States, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 25 (2014). 
 155 Stefano Rodotà, Nuovi Diritti. L’età dei Diritti. Lezioni Norberto Bobbio (Oct. 25, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript) (translation by the author), http://old.cgil.it/archivio/nuovidiritti/
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 156 See generally JOSÉ DANIEL AMADO ET AL., ARBITRATING THE CONDUCT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTORS (2018) (providing a recent reflection on alternative modes to include host state 
population in the arbitration process).  
 157 For a description of first ideas on the IBHR Arbitration Rules, see CLAES CRONSTEDT ET 
AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION (2017), http://www.l4bb.org/
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propose that arbitration be extended to investment-affected people under the 
same legal regime that affords protection to investors. Crafting new rules to 
empower the civil society means addressing the thorny issue of jurisdiction. 
Treaty text would need to be reformed so that investment arbitration tribu-
nals would be competent both ratione materiae and ratione personae to ad-
judicate the disputes brought by investment-affected people against inves-
tors or states.158 The inclusion of reference to the UNGP, as proposed above, 
would establish jurisdiction ratione materiae.159 New treaties should further 
specify that arbitration tribunals have jurisdiction to hear claims against in-
vestors. Arguably the most difficult issue is to establish jurisdiction ratione 
personae. Research has already started to indicate ways to overcome such 
hurdles,160 but future research is necessary to further identify viable legal 
techniques and mechanisms in this realm.  
The binding nature of awards and their enforceability across jurisdic-
tions are clear advantages of retaining arbitration as the main dispute set-
tlement mechanism.161 Nevertheless, our proposal is likely to attract several 
criticisms. First, investment arbitration tribunals may lack the necessary 
competences to deal with human rights issue. Although many arbitrators are 
already highly qualified in the field of human rights, the epistemic commu-
nity of investment arbitrators could be further enlarged so as to ensure that 
in any dispute where human rights are invoked, there are always profes-
sionals who are well-versed in them. As a practical matter, this reform may 
require the obligatory consideration of specific qualifications in the selec-
tion of arbitrators in each dispute at hand. For example, this reform would 
likely require that all arbitrators in a dispute concerning human rights have 
the mandated human rights competences. 
There are several possible criticisms against extending treaty arbitra-
tion to the avail of the civil society. Most importantly, opening arbitration to 
individuals and groups affected by investment may be critiqued for strip-
ping domestic adjudicatory institutions of many of their competences. Ar-
guably, resorting to the customary rule on the exhaustion of domestic legal 
remedies could mitigate the risks of hollowing out core competencies of 
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 158 Ratione materiae is subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW 
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 159 See Ratione materiae, supra note 158. 
 160 See generally JOSÉ DANIEL AMADO ET AL., supra note 156. 
 161 See generally August Reinisch, Enforcement of Investment Awards, in ARBITRATION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 671 (Kate Yannaca-
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domestic courts. It follows that a clear rule on the exhaustion of domestic 
legal remedies for investors and investment-affected people will have to be 
reintroduced under this new system. A more prosaic, although far from triv-
ial, issue relates to the high costs of the arbitration system.162 Such costs 
may yet be a de facto barrier to entry for citizens. Nevertheless, special 
funds, such as the Financial Assistance Fund established by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration,163 or legal aids are all instruments that 
may provide ways to make arbitration affordable to the civil society.164 
One edge of our approach is that the claims of investors and of invest-
ment-affected people concerning the same set of facts could be contextually 
addressed in one proceeding.165 Moreover, the epistemic community of arbi-
trators would grow accustomed to both sets of rights as equally worthy of 
protection. Working with different types of claims can mitigate the risks of 
bias in favor of one group of actors and may facilitate appreciation of com-
plex issues related to investment relations. Finally, our proposal best reflects 
the principle of upholding the equality before the law of investment-
affected people and investors. 
C. A Networked System 
The third model we consider is a networked system. Under this sys-
tem, existing arbitration to the avail of investors could be complemented by 
a grievance mechanism (such as an NCP) for investment-affected people. In 
this case, a new treaty like CETA would necessitate minimum modifica-
tion.166 For example, it could endorse the OECD Guidelines and add that 
 162 The costs of investment arbitration are notoriously high. See generally DIANA ROSERT, INT’L 
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STAKES ARE HIGH: A REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2014), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/
stakes-are-high-review-financial-costs-investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7Q6-
ZLCL]; Gareth Hutchens & Christopher Knaus, Revealed: $39m Cost of Defending Australia’s To-
bacco Plain Packaging Laws, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2018/jul/02/revealed-39m-cost-of-defending-australias-tobacco-plain-packaging-laws 
[https://perma.cc/VX5G-PC4F] (providing a recent example of a costly dispute). 
 163 This Fund has been established for developing countries. See Financial Assistance Fund, 
PERMANENT COURT OF ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/structure/faf/ [https://perma.cc/CX3H-
QRH6]. 
164 See id. 
 165 In several ISDS cases, local communities contended that their rights were being violated 
by claimants in investor-state disputes. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. (USA) v. Republic of Ecuador, 
PCA Case No. 2007-2, Final Award, ¶ 10 (Aug. 31, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0154.pdf [https://perma.cc/93S6-3WYA] (arguing that the claimants were 
attempting to undermine the enforceability of a class action brought by the local residents against 
the claimants for pollution). 
166 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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parties to the treaty should establish the NCP, as provided by the OECD 
Guidelines. Moreover, whenever a question on business and human rights is 
raised by one party, arbitration tribunals should consider past reports of NCPs 
and consult with them. The lack of consideration of NCP reports or the lack 
of consultation when such issue has been raised by a party could also be 
considered a justification to set the claims aside. There are many possible 
variations of such a system. For example, reports by NCPs suggesting vio-
lations of the Guidelines by corporations could constitute the basis for 
counterclaims by states.  
The advantage of a networked system is that it would entail an incre-
mental reform and it could capitalize on the accrued experience of already 
existing institutions. As of today, forty-eight NCPs have been established167 
and, as previously discussed, more than four hundred specific instances 
have been initiated. Additionally, by not making the business and human 
rights instrument formally binding, this reform may be politically viable. 
The downside of such a regime is that it would not fully correct the asym-
metry between the investors and the investment-affected communities. In-
vestors would retain the strong rights under investment treaty arbitration, 
whereas the civil society would be afforded a “reinforced” soft-law mecha-
nism, which could only indirectly influence investment arbitration. Yet, this 
networked system could be considered as merely the beginning of reforms 
in the path to correct the unsustainable imbalance of the current system of 
international investment treaties. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay advocates for a change of paradigm in investment treaty 
law. Under this new paradigm the rights of investment-affected people, to-
gether with obligations of investors, are recognized as part and parcel of the 
investment regime. In sum, the proposed shift is from a system centered on 
protecting the res privata (e.g., investors’ interests) to one protecting the res 
publica (including the interests of the people and community where the in-
vestment is located, as well as those of investors). We have suggested three 
different models to accomplish that objective. The three models presented 
in this Essay, along with their advantages and disadvantages, share the 
common feature of empowering the individuals and the communities affect-
ed by the investment operations. We contend that this is the way forward. 
Still, more research is necessary to further delineate the contours of the 
models identified and to indicate which model may be more viable and apt 
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in different contexts. What is clear is that a system, especially one that is 
allegedly aimed at contributing to the development of the host state, cannot 
so blatantly exclude the interests of the communities that are likely to be af-
fected by those investments. By starting to recognize the relevant rights that 
must be regulated and by referring to environmental protection and human 
rights, the current investment-treaty regime is progressing overall. Never-
theless, if these rights remain without enforcement mechanisms, they are 
likely to remain subaltern to the rights of investors. Grievance mechanisms 
are important, not only to enforce these rights, but also to give a voice to the 
right-holders. It is through this voice that these rights can be better under-
stood and gradually realized. Decades of investment treaty arbitration have 
contributed to the silencing of these voices. It is now time to reform this 
state of affairs, especially if the investment regime intends to be faithful to 
some of its alleged ambitions. 
